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Article 8

NOTES
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-USE Or FORCE IN RETAKING CHATTEL.-In

the recent case of Bear v. Colonial Finance Company 1 a problem was
presented which, in times like the present, is of more than ordinary
significance. John D. Bear bought an automobile from the Myers
Motor Company, which automobile, unknown to the plaintiff, was
mortgaged to the Colonial Finance Company. When the transaction
between Bear and the Myers Motor Company was completed, the
Colonial Finance Company claimed the chattel under the mortgage.
It was brought out in the evidence that Bear strenuously objected to
the seizure, and only consented to deliver the car to a garage designated 'by the defendant, after he had been threatened with arrest, and
upon the promise that the car would be returned to him within a
few days. Thereafter the company sold the car and Bear sued for
conversion, claiming as damages the value of the car. The plaintiff
based his right -to maintain an action for conversion upon the method
and manner adopted by the defendant in repossessing the car. The
court decided that there was no question that a mortgagee after default had a right to possession of the mortgaged property, but that
he was subject to the restriction that he must act iri an orderly manner and without creating a breach of peace. It held that to threaten
one with arrest was a breach of peace, and as equally reprehensible
as if physical force had been employed to overcome resistance. The
decision is decidedly in harmony with views expressed in the majority
of cases dealing with this problem.
In the case of McCarty-Green Motor Co. v. House 2 the court
held that under an express provision of the contract giving the vendor
the right upon default to take possession of the property without resort
to legal process, he may do so if he does not commit a breach of the
peace or an unlawful trespass. Further, the court said, that although
under a contract giving the vendor the right to repossess the property
sold, upon default in payment therefor without any proceedings at
law, the vendor had the right to retake possession, nevertheless it had
no right to regain possession by force and arms, nor to employ fraud,
deception, trick, or artifice to that end. The decision in Stowers Co.
v. Brake 3 was to the same effect. In substance it was that the seller
in a contract of conditional sale may take possession of the property.
wherever it may be, after breach of condition, but the taking must be
peaceable. A leading case on this subject in Indiana is Singer Sewing
1 182 N E. 521 (Ohio 1932).
2 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60 (1927).
3 158 Ala. 639, 48 So. 89 (1908).
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Machine Co. v. Pkipps,4 in which a sewing machine sold under a conditional sales agreement was in controversy. The court's holding was
that where the plaintiff's possession of the sewing machine was lawful
in its inception, the forcible taking of possession thereof by defendant's
agents, over the protest of the one in possession, and while the plaintiff was sitting thereon, constituted assault and battery where she was
thrown and injured by reason of such act, even th6ugh such agents
did not touch the plaintiff. Further, the cases of Gilliland v. Martin 5
and Hawkins Furniture Co. v. Morris 6 hold that the power given to
a chattel mortgagee to take possession of the mortgaged property,
even though it creates an irrevocable power coupled with an interest,
does not authorize the mortgagee to take such possession when to do
so any force whatever involving the slightest assault or breach of
peace, is required.
From a perusal of the above cited cases we may draw the following general conclusions: That the existence of a privilege of forcible
recaption is denied where:
1. Chattels are sold under a conditional sale, the right of possession having reverted to the vendor by the vendee's failure
to fulfill the condition.
2. Chattels of which possession had been given under a lease under
which title was to pass to the lessee upon the full payment
of the rent, the right of possession having reverted to the
lessor by reason of the lessee's failure to pay an instalment of
rent.
F. X. Kopinski.
MORTGAGES-MORTGAGOR As TENANT OF MORTGAGEE.-The question as to whether a mortgagor in possession is a tenant of the mortgagee is still the subject of the judiciary today.1 In "lien" states this
question can hardly arise, 2 because in such states "at law as in equity
the mortgagee has only a right of security incident to the mortgage
debt and the legal estate continues in the mortgagor." 3
What the relation is that exists between the actual owner of land
in "title" states who executes a mortgage on it and the one to whom
the mortgage is so executed has been variously explained by courts
and text-writers. Where a mortgagor, after execution of a first mortgage, retains possession of the mortgaged land, he has been said to
4
5

49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 793 (1911).

6

143 Ky. 738, 137 S. W. 527 (1911).
In re Aville Realty Corporation, 57 Fed. (2d) 882 (N. Y. 1932).
Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, § 45a.
William F. Walsh, Development of the Title and Lien Theories of Mort9 N. Y. L. Rev. 280, 300.

1

2
3
gages,

149 Ala. 672, 42 So. 7 (1906).
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be: (1) "The tenant at the sufferance of the mortgagee, who may
at his pleasure enter and thereby put an end to such tenancy;" 4 and
(2) "Tenant at will to the mortgagee". 5 These views concerning the
relation existing between a mortgagor and mortgagee have been based
upon the reason that the "seizin, or possession, as well as the title,
passes to the mortgagee immediately upon the execution of the mortgage, even .though the mortgagor retains the possession in fact." 6
A tenancy at sufferance arises when a person comes into possession
of land lawfully, 'but holds over wrongfully after the determination of
his interest, differing in this respect from a tenancy at will, where
the holding is by the landlord's permission. That is to say, such a
tenancy is created when one enters into possession under a lawful
demise, and his retention of possession after the expiration of his
term is by the mere laches or neglect of the owner to take possession
7
of the premises-the entry is lawful, but the holding over is wrongful.
But a mortgagor is in possession either by the express or implied consent of the mortgagee, or merely because the mortgagee does not care
8
to take possession and thereby incur liability for rents and profits.
"In the former case the mortgagor is, it seems, a tenant of the mortgagee as having permissive possession under him. In the latter case
he is not a tenant of the mortgagee, it is submitted, since he does not
hold under him." 9 A tenant at sufferance at common law is not liable
for rent, if the tenant is occupying originally by the permission of the
landlord; but he is liable on an implied contract in assumpsit for
use and occupation of the premises. 10 But an action of quasi contract
will not lie against a mortgagor for use and occupation, while he is
in possession, for he is not obligated to account for rents and profits
to the mortgagee."1

A tenancy at will is a tenancy of indefinite duration expressly made
at the will of the landlord and held at the will of the tenant; it is
not a tenancy for life or in fee, but is one of no fixed period which
12
may be terminated by either the landlord or the tenant at any time.
Such a tenant is not liable for "permissive" waste, that is, waste resulting from a failure on the part of the tenant in possession to make
repairs and to maintain the property in a reasonable manner,' 3 because
Brown v. Cram, 1 N. H. 169, 171 (1818).
5 Judd v. Woodruff, 2 Root 298, 299 (1795).
6 Brown v. Cram, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 171.
7/ Sharpe v. Mathews, 51 S. E. 706, 708 (Ga. 1905); Jackson v. Parkhurst,
4

5 Johns. 128 (1809).
8 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 2.
9 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 2.
10 Burke v. Williard, 249 Mass. 313, 132 N. E. 223 (Mass. 1923).
11

Jones on Mortgages, 7th ed., at § 671.

12 Walsh, The Law of Property, at § 160.
13 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 66.
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a tenant at will was held not to come with the Statutes of Marlbridge,' 4 and of Gloucester, 15 since his interest was slight compared
to a tenant for life, or for years.10 Accordingly it has been held in
Massachusetts that a tenant at will was not liable for his negligent
burning of a building on the premises. 17 For an act of voluntary
waste, that is, when the waste itself results from acts of commission
by the tenant,' 8 a tenant at will has been ,held liable. It has also
been held in Massachusetts that a tenant at will was liable for placing
too great weight in a barn, a a result of which the floor of the barn
gave way. 19 The holding in the latter case is explained 'by the negligence or wilful wrong of the tenant, since negligence or wilful wrong
on a tenant's part renders him liable. It is difficult to reconcile
this decision with the case referred to of the tenant's negligent
burning of the buildings, but it seems in the barn case the waste
was of the "voluntary" type, and being an act of hostility to
the landlord which terminated the tenancy at-will, rendering such
tenant liable to his landlord in trespass. 20 A mortgagor in possession
is the owner of the estate, and may exercise all rights of ownership,
and even commit waste, provided he does not diminish the security or
21
render it insufficient.
An obligation to pay rent is not a necessary incident of a tenancy
at will, 2 2 yet an action in quasi contract will lie against a tenant at
will for use and occupation. 23 But a mortgagor of real estate is not,
as a general rule, liable for rent while in possession. 24 In Anderson v.
Robbins 25 it was said: "On account of the peculiar relation subsisting
between the parties to a mortgage, the mortgagor, though the title be
in the mortgagee, cannot be required to pay rent to the latter so long
as he is allowed to remain in possession, since his contract is to pay
26
interest and not rent.
52 Henry III c. 23.
6 Edw. 1, c. 5. See Walsh, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 61.
Phillips v. Covert and Covert, 7 Johns. 1 (1810); Moore ads. Townshend,
33 N. J. Law 284 (1869).
17 Lathrop v. Thayer, 138 Mass. 466 (1885).
Is Walsh, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 60.
19 Chalmers v. Smith, 152 Mass. 561 (1891).
20 Chalmers v. Smith, op. cit. supra note 19.
21 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Hoboken & M. R. Co., 63 Atl. 273, 278 (Ct. of Ch.
of N. J. 1906), citing Kerr on Injunctions, § 262; Field v. Tate, 42 Atl. 742, 743
(N. J. 1899).
22 Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24 (1872).
23 Christy v. Tancred, 7 M. & W. 127; Bayley v. Bradley, 5 C. B. 396.
But see Chamberlain v. Donahue, 45 Vt. 50 (1872).
14
15
16

24 Gilman v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 23 L. Ed. 405, 410 (1875); Jones on
Mortgages, 7th ed., § 671.
25 19 Atl. 910, 911 (Me. 1890).
26 Accord: Chase v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346 (1845).
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The courts in some "title" states have expressly repudiated the
view that any relation of landlord and tenant exists between a mortgagee and a mortgagor in possession of the mortgaged property.2 7 The
court in Morse v. Stafford 28 said: "The relation of landlord and tenant may exist 'between the mortgagee and mortgagor, or one claiming
under the latter; but this relation is not presumed to exist between
such parties, and does not grow out of the relations of mortgagee and
mortgagor." In "title" states the mortgagor is not a tenant within the
statutes relating to forcible entry and detainer,2 9 so that the summary
process provided by these statutes is not applicable to the case of a
mortgagor in possession, who has prevented the mortgagee from taking
possession, or excluded him after possession taken. 30 In an early New
York case 31 it was said: "It has been repeatedly decided in this
court, that as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, the former is to
be regarded as a tenant at will by implication, and is entitled to notice
(by which is meant six months notice) to quit." But the weight of
authority is contra; no notice to quit, or previous demand, is necessary
to entitle a mortgagee to maintain ejectment against a mortgagor in a
32
"title" state.
It is only in a general sense that a mortgagor in possession in a
"title" state may be regarded as a tenant at will of the mortgagee.
Where it has been contended that the relational rights and duties of
a landlord and tenant apply to the mortgagor and mortgagee relationship, the courts in the "title" states have generally considered that
there is no relation of landlord and tenant existing. At an early date
Lord Mansfield said: "Now a mortgagor is not properly tenant at will
to the mortgagee, for he is not to pay him rent. He is so only quodam
modo. Nothing is more apt to confound than a simile. When the
court, or counsel call a mortgagor a tenant at will, it is barely a comparison.

He is like a tenant at will."

33

Arthur Duffy.

27 Morse v. Stafford, 49 Atl. 45 (Me. 1901).
28 Op. cit. supra note 27, at p. 46.
29 Clement v. Bennett, 70 Me. 207, 209 (1879).
30 Reed v. Elwell, 46 Me. 270, 279 (1858).
31

Jackson v. Hopkins, 18 Johns. 487, 488 (1821).
Rockwell v. Bradley, 2 Conn. 1 (1816); Lackey v. Holbrook, 11 Met.
458 (1846).
33 Moss. v. Gallimore, 1 Doug. 279 (1779).
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NEGLIGENCE-PLEADING OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE, THEN
RELYING ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR.-In Barger v. Ckelpan 1 it was de-

cided that the pleading of the specific acts of negligence did not affect
the plaintiff's right to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is
probable that when an accident happens which would not occur ordinarily if the required degree of care were exercised, that such care
was not exercised by the person in control of the situation.2 When
the facts attendant upon the accident give rise to an inference of
negligence the maxim applies. This doctrine, when applicable, raises
an inference of negligence on the part of the one in control of the
device causing the injury merely from the accident itself. 3 The logical
reason for adopting the maxim, res ipsa loquitur, and having it favor
the plaintiff, is because the course of the injury can be more easily
apprehended by the defendant while it is quite improbable that the
plaintiff would know the cause. 4 As a result of the adoption of the
rule, the plaintiff merely has to allege the accident and attendant circumstances and the resultant injury to himself. 5 A question of the
applicability of the doctrine arises when the plaintiff goes further than
alleging general negligence and alleges specific acts of negligence.
(a) Some courts have held that the doctrine does not apply. 6 If the
plaintiff alleges specific acts it becomes incumbent upon him to prove
them as he manifests by his allegation that he is acquainted with the
negligent condition. 7 (b) Other courts have held that there is no presumption in favor of the plaintiff, but merely an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant which he can overcome by competent explanation. 8 (c) The better view as to the application of the
doctrine is that it can be relied upon by the plaintiff.0 The plaintiff's
case does not stand or fall upon proof of the Specific act; and, according to the weight of authority, if the case is a proper one for the
application of the doctrine, the plaintiff by pleading the particular
cause of .the accident in no way loses his right to rely thereon.' 0 In
the majority of cases a general form of allegation is sufficient against
a demurrer interposed by the defendant that the petition does not
state a cause of action, and specific acts of negligence may be incor1

243 N. W. 97 (S. D. 1932).

2 5 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) §§ 2490, 2509.
3 Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Wigmore, op. cit.
supra note 2, at § 2509.
4 Wigmore, op. cit. sura note 2, at § 2509.
5 Kaemnerling v. Athletic Mining and Smelting Company, 2 Fed. (2d)
574 (1924).
6 Roscoe v. Metropolitan St. Ry Co., 101 S. W. 32 (Mo. 1907).

7 Clark on Code Pleading (1st ed. 1928) 208.
8 Palmer Brick Co. v. Chevall, 47 S.E. 329 (Ga. 1904).
9 Firszt v. Capital Park Realty Co., 120 Atl. 300 (Conn. 1923).
10 Negligence, 20 R. C. L., p. 187.
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porated, not as explanations of general negligence, but as further
specified acts of which the general allegation is only the first." By
establishing the fact that the defendant was managing, operating and
controlling the thing which caused the injury, the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie case and will win if the defendant is unable to explain
by sufficient evidence.' 2 Res ipsa liquitur does not relieve the plaintiff from proving negligence nor does it raise any presumtion in his
favor, but it only changes the mode of the proof of negligence.
There is a difference between an inference and a presumption in that
an inference may persuade the jury to return a verdict upon the evidence as they see it, whereas a technical presumption, as an unexplained absence for seven years gives rise to the presumption of death,
demands a verdict subject to the court's direction. 13 The principal case
follows the better view, which holds that where the plaintiff has asserted specific acts of negligence on part of the defendant he may
rely on the general presumption of negligence wherein the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies. 14 The principal case seems to adopt the
third view and represents the modem trend of authority.
Herbert P. Giorgio.
TRIAL-OPINION OR BELIEF OF JUDGE AS TO FACTS.-A growing

tendency of recent years in Pennsylvania allowing the trial judge to
invade the province of the jury has reached such elastic bounds that
the production of justice is in danger. Following the English practice,
Pennsylvania allows a judge to express his opinion upon the facts in
his charge to the jury if he warns the jury they are not to be bound
by his opinion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealtk v. Orr,' speaking through Chief Justice Paxson, stated: "We
have said in repeated instances that it is not error for a judge to
express his opinion upon the facts if done fairly; nay, more that it
may be his duty to do so in some cases, provided he does not give a
binding direction, or interfere with the province of the jury." This
doctrine has been upheld almost without exception and when a principle of this type has become so well rooted the courts seem unable
to resist the temptation of abusing it by going beyond the widest
latitude of comment or expression of opinion on the evidence permitted to a trial judge.
11
12

Clark, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 208 et seq.
Edgerton v. New York & H. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 227 (1868).

13 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, at §§ 2509, 2490.
14 Clark, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 213; Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co.,
186 N. W. 123 (Minn. 1921).
1 138 Pa. St. 276, 20 Atl. 866 (1890).

NOTES
The early Courts of Pennsylvania were reluctant to uphold this
liberal view, as is evidenced by the statement of Thompson, J., in
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in Ditmars et al. v. The
Commonwealth:" "Care must always be taken, however, not to infringe the province of the jury, so as to relieve them from the full
responsibility of pronouncing an intelligent judgment .

.

." This opin-

ion was in keeping with the view of the courts at that time, but since,
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction.
Two comparatively recent Pennsylvania cases are typical of the4
3
modem view, Commonwealth v. Gross, and Commonwealth v. Bloom.
In the Gross case the court said, in its charge to the jury: "I say to
you frankly, members of the jury, that in the light of all the testimony in this case it seems to us that you ought to have no difficulty in
arriving at a verdict of guilty on both counts of the indictment," but
followed it with the statement that they were entirely free to determine
the defendant's guilt or innocence, and were not bound by his opinion,
and the judgment was affirmed. In the Bloom case, the Superior Court
approved the charge of Stevens, J., in which, the latter, upon concluding a review of the defendant's testimony and inferences drawn
therefrom, states: "To the court this seems plainly unbelievable," but
continued to warn the jury that it was not the purpose of this expression to withdraw the evidence from their consideration and decision.
(Bloom had testified that palatable alcoholics in his possession were
for "rubbing purposes" and "automobile radiators.")
It might be argued, with more or less reasonableness, that the adoption of the present theorylmay be attributed to the difficulty of prosecuting attorneys obtaining convictions in the trial of the common run
of defendants in late criminal cases. We cannot escape this viewpoint,
particularly in reference to .those cases involving the imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment brought about by laws which the jury approach with an unsympathetic attitude accompanied with a reluctance
to find the accused guilty. However, the unconscious collusion of the
court with the prosecuting attorney is not justified to overcome this
probable prejudice of the jury. If this practice is persisted in by the
trial courts, the resulting dangers are obvious. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury and the court's expression is an usurpation of
the functions of the jury. It is true that the judge warns the jury
that they are not to be influenced by his opinion but the damage is
done, the moral restraint has already been imposed. It may readily
be seen that this practice will eventually, and within a short time at
the present rate of development, do away entirely with the jury system.
Elmer M. Crane.
2 47 Pa. St. 335, 337 (1864).
3 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 387 (1926).
4 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 308 (1926).

